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Abstract
Global public goods, differently from what it might be thought, are quite common in the real world. This work suggests that both the 
governments’ struggle against Mafia and the prevention of immigration can be regarded as global public goods. We assume a 
federation of jurisdictions with two tiers of Government: the central and the local. Regional utility directly represents the preferences 
of citizens, since the local governments aim at individualistic utility maximization; central government uses the redistribution of 
resources among the members of the federation to maximize the social welfare which is given, as usual, by the sum of regional 
utilities. The Central Government aims at welfare maximization. To get its goal it has to find out the efficient way to fund and 
provide public goods taking into account not only their particular characteristics but also the fact that, in many circumstances, their 
production faces increasing cost, which may depend both on the quantity of good produced and on the type (high or low cost) of the 
producer (which, in this framework, coincides with the jurisdiction). Thus the first issue addressed by the paper concerns the choice 
between central and local provision.
Furthermore, as far as the informational structure is concerned, the centre lacks information concerning the type of each region. Thus, 
the central government’s key informational problem concerns the regional costs and quantities with regard both to the public and the 
private good. Indeed we assume that the centre can observe the expenditure levels but neither the costs nor the outputs associated 
with those expenditure levels. 
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Modern fiscal federalism is based on funding schemes intended to induce efficiency in the 
local governments’ provision of public goods through a system of incentives. The goal consists on 
granting a minimum level for public services locally provided but also in providing incentives for 
higher level of quality. We refer to a local public good when the economic jurisdiction coincides 
with the administrative jurisdiction. However when the local public good is characterized by 
externalities that affect other jurisdictions then we refer to it as “global public good”. With 
reference to the latter we observe that the economic jurisdiction exceeds the administrative one. A 
global public good may be produced at central or local level but nonetheless it is consumed by all 
the members of the federation in the same amount.
Global public goods are not infrequent in real world. As an example we may refer to the 
pollution control or to the scientific research. Perhaps a more interesting example of global public 
good is represented by the struggle against Mafia. The Mafia phenomenon was at the beginning 
circumscribed to Sicily, but Mafia economic and criminal interests have spread out and at present it 
is considered “global”, even trespassing the Italian borders. The struggle against Mafia and other 
criminal organization is carried on by the Governments’ justice. The administration of justice is, 
according to the Italian legal order, attributed to the central government level. However its 
provision is regionally produced by courts of law, judges, public prosecutor, and police. On the 
contrary in Germany the judicial function is attributed to Länder except for the supreme court
2. As 
well in Switzerland the justice administration has a local character. Everyday public debate submits 
the discussion about the insufficient funding devoted to the “justice” implying inefficiencies and 
sub-optimal provision of the public good (quantity and quality below a minimum desirable level). 
Since the problem of lack of resources devoted to justice varies according to jurisdictions’ utility, it 
emerges that the matter is locally differently perceived and worth. The local level of justice might 
be considered good enough in some areas whereas in some other it might be considered insufficient 
in terms of both quality and quantity. According to these empirical evidence it could be taken into 
account the hypothesis of a  unique  judicial system that is locally financed and provided. The 
struggle against Mafia represents a global public good in the sense that the overall quantity 
consumed by each government (or citizen) equalizes the quantity produced on the whole.
Also the prevention of immigration can be regarded as a pure public good at least within the 
Schengen area. The Schengen agreement, signed at present by 28 European Countries, requires the 
removal of systematic controls between the participating Countries. As a consequence, once 
immigrants enter the Schengen area, regardless to the entering point, they are able to freely move 
over. Therefore all the Countries members of the Schengen agreement face the same risk regardless 
2 Fossati et al. (2000)
2to the border that has been violated. The border police service is a good locally provided, but it 
represents a pure public good inside the Schengen area. 
Public goods models are used to explain central government’s economic policies, and the 
literature has shown much interest in examining how decentralized Nash equilibrium might 
approach   Pareto   efficiency   with   appropriate   incentive   schemes   under   different   information 
requirements. Even if Williams (1966) claims that “the complex interactions that occur even in 
highly simplified  situations make it impossible to predict a priori whether undersupply or 
oversupply will generally result”, with perfect information the standard literature assess that when a 
public good is privately provided, then the level of its provision turns to be at a lower level with 
respect to the optimal socially desirable one. However, in the context of fiscal federalism income 
redistribution might be ineffective, since Warr (1983) shows that the overall level of public good 
individually supplied might be independent from income redistribution. The neutrality theorem has 
been originally discussed by Kemp (1984), which extends the theorem to the case of more than one 
public good, and by Bergstrom et al. (1986) which “analyze the extent to which government 
provision of a public good “crowds out” private contributions”. At any rate, the discussion has 
highlighted that: i) individuals must behave as atomistic utility maximizers, ii) the redistribution of 
income has to take place among current contributors of the public good, and iii) individuals must 
face an identical constant prices.
Recent and growing literature on fiscal federalism relates with the implications of information 
asymmetry when local jurisdictions face different cost for the provision of public good (Cornes and 
Silva, 2002; Huber and Runkel, 2006). 
Our model shows a close relation with the work of Huber and Runkel (2006), but with 
important differences: first of all we consider what we call here global public goods while they 
focus their analysis on the local public good, secondly they assume a separable utility function, 
whereas our analysis is more general and the separability condition is not required. Thirdly, they 
implicitly assume the same utility function for any jurisdictional type, while in the present paper the 
utility is allowed to vary from region to region according to the jurisdiction’s type (high or low 
cost).
Hence the immigration control and the struggle against Mafia (this latter with reference to just 
a few of Countries) are “to all intents and purposes” locally provided public goods. In turn it 
implies local variable costs that depend on several country-specific parameters. In particular we 
assume that the cost function which characterizes the production of the global public good depends 
on a cost parameter (that varies according to the jurisdiction’s type) and on the level of good 
supplied. Thus we adopt a fairly general cost function  ) , ( i i
i
i x E e J =  for the public good x, where 
3q  is the cost parameter, i=low(l), high(h) indicates the jurisdiction’s type; we account for two types 
of good: a private and a public one. 
We assume that regional utility directly represents the preferences of citizens, since the local 
governments aim at individualistic utility maximization; central government uses the redistribution 
of resources among the members of the federation to maximize the social welfare which is given, as 
usual, by the sum of regional utility. 
As far as the informational structure is concerned, the centre knows that there are different 
types of regions characterized by different cost, income and utility. However, it lacks information 
concerning   the   type   to   which   each   region   belongs.   Thus,   the   central   government’s   key 
informational problem concerns the regional costs and quantities with regard both to the public and 
the private good. Indeed we assume that the centre can observe the expenditure levels but neither 
the costs nor the outputs associated with those expenditure levels. 
In comparison with the current literature, the present paper contributes to the topic in two 
ways. Firstly we are able to highlight the conditions which call for a transfer from the high to the 
low cost region or vice versa in a fairly general setting, where no particular assumptions on utility 
and cost functions are required. Secondly, in an asymmetric information setting, we show how 
central governments might be limited by incentive compatibility constraints. 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the model is presented and the receiving 
region is identified. In Section 3 asymmetry of information is examined. Finally, in Section 4 some 
concluding remarks are presented.
42. The model
Suppose an economic federation consisting of two tiers of government: a central government 
(the State) and a given number of regional governments. We assume that each region provides the 
following two goods: the private good y and the public good x. The production cost for the private 
good y is identical among jurisdictions and set, for simplicity, equal to 1. On the other hand the cost 
for the public good x differs according to the jurisdiction’s type. We distinguish between the low 
cost region’s type and the high one, denoting the former by the l index and the latter by the h index. 
The federation comprises  L>1  (l=1....L) number of low cost type identical regions and  H>1 
(h=1...H)  of high cost identical regions.  The type   { } h l i , Î   region faces an expenditure cost 
) , ( i i
i x E q  on x which depends and increases both on the quantity of the public good xi provided, and 
on the  θi  cost parameter, assuming  θh>θl. The latter characteristic is rendered explicit by the 






x E E E E q q  (the subscript indicates the variable with respect to 
which the E cost function has been derived, either at first or second order). The maximization 
problem that faces the region type  { } h l i , Î  is given by  ) , (    X y U u Max i






subject to the budget constraint 
i
i
i i E y R + = +t , where R
i is the region’s i income and t
i is a 
lump-sum transfer (either positive or negative) set by the central government. We adopt standard 
assumptions for the U(× ) function: it is increasing in y and X and strictly quasiconcave, as well as 
that all goods are normal. In order to maximize the utility function subject to the budget constraint, 
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Using the implicit function theorem, the optimal values
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To let the analysis as simple as possible, let’s assume there are just two jurisdictions different 
in type; the central government maximization problem turns out to be the following:
] , [ ] , [ ] , , [
j j i i j i y X U y X U y y X MaxW + =
t
subject to the following constraints:
j i x x X + = (associated lm: s )
3 The subscript indicates the derivative with respect to that variable, i.e., for instance  x U Ux ¶ ¶ º (.)    
4 Which represent as well the demand function along the optimal path
5- budget constraint
t J + = +
i i i i i R x E y ) , ( (associated lm: 
i l )
t J - = +
j j j j j R x E y ) , ( (associated lm: 
j l )
- non negativity constraints
0 , , , ³
j j i i y x y x
where i and j represents the regional type.
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Only when this condition is met, the social welfare is maximized. 
At first full information is assumed. The Central Government can transfer money from one 
jurisdiction to the other (under the constraint to satisfy the condition for public budget balance) 
pursuing the social welfare maximization, but, as it will be shown later on, this result cannot be 
reached even in the complete information scenario
5. 
At first the transfer sign has to be identified. Sticking with the full information hypothesis it 
emerges that the “necessary and sufficient” information to identify the transfer sign is provided by 
the marginal utility on good y ( y U ) and the marginal expenditure on the public good ( x E ).
















x E E <  then i has to be 








x E E > . Thus the global 
public good scenario presents this new insight. The transfer has to equalize at the margin the utility 
(with respect to the private good) and the expenditure (with respect to the public good) of the two 




x E E =  is straightforward: since good x is a global 
public good, then its production has to be set in order to minimize its producing cost, given the 
optimal amount of public good. In other words the production has to split between the two 
jurisdictions so to contain as much as possible the overall cost.
But things are more complicated than they appear. In fact, in the case of the global public 
good the condition  required  for the welfare maximization  does not correspond to  that of 
individualistic   (Nash)   utility   maximization   but   they   sensibly   differ:   the   individual   utility 
5 At least without more assumptions.
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, .
The implication is straightforward: when the good x is a global public good (even though 
locally provided), it is not possible to reach a first best by means of a transfer of money among the 
jurisdictions, even in presence of perfect information. Obviously a first best might be obtained by 




*, i=l,h to each jurisdiction which is tantamount to say 
that a Leviathan sets (and forces) the optimal values suppressing the regional autonomy and 
considering the jurisdictions as a whole with the center.
Giving up with this “first best hypothesis”, a second issue should be investigated: assuming a 
Nash behaviour among the regions, it is still possible to improve the social welfare (even in a 
second best scenario) by a money transfer among the regions and, in the case it is, what should be 
the sign of that transfer?
To answer this question the optimal values for x and y have to be taken into account:
( ) ( ) j j i i
y
i j j i i
x
i R R y R R x
i i q q x q q x , , , ; , , , = =
(18)
From them (see appendix for details) and by differentiating the first order equation system, 
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It can be shown that a money transfer between the two type of local governments would yield 













































































The sign of   l
h
dU
dU   can turn to be greater, lower or equal to zero. The transfer sign is 
determined according to the sign of the ratio: if  0 > l
h
dU
dU  the transfer moves from the high cost 
region to the low one, if   0 < l
h
dU
dU   the opposite applies. The transfer that follows the afore-
7mentioned rule permits the improvement of the general welfare, assuming the Nash behaviour of 
local governments.
Another aspect concerning the ratio of eq.19 deserves attention; if the second derivative of the 
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 are always positive (see 
appendix for details)





 will be always positive. This result implies that it is 
possible to improve the social welfare transferring money from the high cost region to the low cost 
one. 




x E E -  is positive when the j region price for the public good is 
greater than i. In that case both dU
i and dU
j are positive, otherwise both dU
i and dU
j are negative.
This statement shows a very important consequence for the equilibrium. In fact, it turns out 
that   without   any   central   authority   intervention,   the  local   jurisdictions   find   it   profitable   to 
autonomously proceed with money transfers from the high cost type to the low cost one. In other 
words, in the presence of a global public good and linear prices for its production, then the Nash 
behaviour approaches the social welfare goal. In fact a money transfer increases the utility of the 
receiver but also that of the donor’s. This result coincides with that provided by Buchholz and 
Konrad (1995). 








x E E E E ¹ > > ; 0 ; 0 ) the outcome of a autonomous money transfer among governments is still a 
possible scenario. Let consider the local government i indirect utility:
)] ) , ( ( ), [( max ) , , , (
j i i i i i j i i x e B e R U x e V + - - = J t J t
8where  
i i i x e B = ) , (J is   obtained   by   inverting   the   cost   function   ) , (
i i i i x E e J = ,   with 




e e B e B J J .
By the indirect utility it is possible to derive the condition that benefit government i from a 
autonomous money transfer to j when governments act according to the Nash rule.












de B U U U
dx
] [ - +
>
t
It turns immediately clear that the afore mentioned condition is rarely met, but nonetheless it 
represents a possible outcome: the local jurisdictions i might find it profitable to autonomously 
proceed with money transfers to j so that to improve its own utility and in so doing improving also 
the other region utility and logically also the social welfare. Even though a social optimum is not 
reachable by this mechanism, at least a general welfare improvement is observable.








x E E =  (that makes the model to converge 
to the case in which regions face an identical constant prices) then an income redistribution would 
be   ineffective.   According   to   the   Warr   (1983)   Neutrality   Theorem   a   redistribution   among 
jurisdictions would not affect the overall level of public good individually supplied. Furthermore 
even the individual consumption of the private good would remain constant regardless to the 
income redistribution.
93. Global public good and asymmetry of information
In this new scenario we assume that the center knows both the utility and the cost functions of 
jurisdictions, but information about the quantity provided for the public and the private good is not 
available. The center observes the expenditure on the private good (y) and the expenditure on the 
public good (E) that local jurisdictions face, but quantities are unverifiable. To this extent incentive 
compatible constraints have to be taken into account in the decisional process. The maximization 
problem for the central government can be set as follows:
] , [ ] , [ ] , , [
j j i i j i y X U y X U y y X MaxW + =
t
subject to the following constraints:
j i x x X + = (associated lm: s )
- budget constraint
t J + = +
i i i i i R x E y ) , ( (associated lm: 
i l )
t J - = +
j j j j j R x E y ) , ( (associated lm: 
j l )
- incentive compatible constraints
( ) { }
j R i R
j i j j j i
x
j i i i y x E x U y X U
>
+ ³ , ] ), , ( [ ] , [ J J y (associated lm: 
i m ) (21)
( ) { }
i j R R
i j i i i j
x
i j j j y x E x U y X U
> + ³ , ] ), , ( [ ] , [ J J y (associated lm: 
j m ) (22)
- non negativity constraints
0 , , , ³
j j i i y x y x (23)
Let’s assume that the center knows that the sign of the transfer t  has to be set greater than 
zero:  0 > t . This latter implies that the j region is taxed while the i region is subsidized. This 
assumption allows us to set  0 =
i m  given that the first (eq.21) incentive compatibility constraint is 
not binding. In fact provided that region i receives the subsidy while region j is taxed, the Lagrange 
multiplier 
i m assumes the zero value because the i region has no advantages to misrepresenting its 
type declaring to be the other type.
The Central Government knows that the local behaviour meet the Nash rule, and each 
jurisdiction reacts to the other’s behaviour. As a consequence the central government is forced to 
change the contract terms: both the receiver and the donor will be submitted to audit and forced to 
show a well defined expenditure on both the private and the public good. Each region will be free to 
opt for paying the tax τ and show the expenditure Ex
j or receive a subsidy equal to τ and show the 
expenditure Ex
i. The afore mentioned drawback directly derives from the equation system provided 




y x E SMS = , .
10The FOCs for this new maximization problem are reported in appendix.
From b.2 and b.3 we derive the crucial information that the center is avoided to reach the 
equivalence, at the margin, of regions’ public good production cost. Since the transfer moves, by 
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j i E E = is not reachable when the information is 
incomplete. The second best equilibrium requires that the difference between marginal expenditure 
E can only be reduced by the transfer. It unavoidably follows up that the receiving region i receives 
a lower transfer as consequence of the incentive compatibility constraints. Therefore the receiving 
region will have a lower disposable income and the contributing a higher disposable income with 
respect to the first best scenario. Denoting by * the first best (perfect information) and by ° the 
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i i i U U U m - > . This condition obviously diverges from that of 












,  implies a greater value for the overall amount of good 
X, but this condition is counterbalanced by the fact that the component at the right hand side of 






j j E E
*  (as showed above).
Any assessment concerning the amount of the global public good X produced is prevented. 
Intuitively we may predict that when the transfer moves from the high cost region to the low cost 
one then  ° > X X
* . On the other hand when the transfer has the opposite sign, we might expect 
11° < X X
* . In fact in the first case the low cost region receives a lower amount of transfer with 
respect to the complete information scenario, whereas in the second case the low cost region 
undergoes a lower taxation, and we know that the low cost region is able to produce the same 
amount of public good at a lower price with respect to the high cost one.
4. Concluding remarks
The issue addressed concerns the best way to fund and provide pure public goods assuming 
that their production cost is non constant and depending on a parameter cost that varies according to 
the jurisdiction type and to the level of good supplied. In particular we refer to governments 
struggle against Mafia and immigration containment. With reference to the former it is possible to 
find Countries characterized by a local provision (e.g., Germany and Switzerland) and Countries 
where the justice is administrate by the centre (e.g., Italy). The control of the illegal Mafia activities 
represents a pure public good in the Samuelsonian sense, since the overall consumption of it by 
each Country (or region) is equal to the sum of the overall provision.
The latter refers to the Schengen area. Because of the Schengen Agreement it is possible to 
consider all the countries members of the treaty as a whole, but its borders are controlled by single 
member Sates. The control activity of immigration carried on by each border’s State affects the 
utility of all the members of the Schengen Agreement. The borders’ control in order to avoid 
immigration (that is a public good) is locally provided but equally consumed inside the Schengen 
Area.
The afore-mentioned public goods show variable costs in their production depending on both 
the regional characteristic and the quantity produced. 
Aiming at welfare maximization, what is the best option to be adopted between central and 
local for their provision? The answer is not that neat. The central provision seems to be (at first 
glance) Pareto superior. In fact, from a theoretical point of view it could be possible to reach a first 
best outcome. However this result is obtainable under the strong assumption of full information 
with reference to individual preferences, cost function and income.
The Oates’ decentralization theorem (1972) suggests that central provision is subject to the 
condition of a uniform provision (among all the local jurisdictions) of the public good. Obviously in 
the present model the uniform provision has to be intended in terms of expenditure rather than 
quantity. Because of that unnecessary constraint a central provision can’t be anything else than a 
second best. A trivial objection is that nationally provided services do not necessarily have to be 
standardized, but nonetheless is clear that central provision is subject (in practice) to a wider 
number of constraints with respect to local provision. Another support for local provision is 
provided by Stigler (1957) which suggests as justification the asymmetric information that 
12characterizes   the   market.   Hence   Stigler   assumes   that   the   central   government   knows   local 
preferences less precisely (with a random error) with respect to the local governments. As a 
consequence the centre decision rule results biased implying either over or under provision of the 
public good. In our opinion the Stigler’s information assumption well fit the local private 
information with respect both to the production cost and preferences.
Unfortunately, with non constant production cost, even the local provision of public good 
shows drawbacks. In particular, as it is proven in this paper, a first best outcome in the production 
of a global public good is unreachable even under perfect information when the local governments 
behave according to the Nash rule. However a money redistribution may allow for social welfare 
improvement, under the condition that the redistribution follows the rule provided. In the limiting 
case of constant and equal price for the public good, Warr(1983) showed the ineffectiveness of any 
redistribution policy (among those jurisdictions that voluntarily contribute to the provision of public 
good). On the other hand, assuming constant prices that vary among jurisdictions, we find, as 
expected, the result suggested by Buchholz and Konrad (1995): the Nash behaviour approaches the 
social welfare goal, given that the jurisdiction with a low productivity has an incentive to make 
large unconditional transfers to the other jurisdiction.
Moving back to our assumption of a non constant price for the public good it could emerge 
the quite unexpected result that a Nash voluntary transfer among jurisdictions (and the consequent 
social welfare improvement) is still a possible scenario. The necessary condition (presented at the 
end of section 2) might be difficult to be met, but nonetheless it would allow for a social welfare 
improvement without requiring any central authority intervention (recalling however that, by an 
autonomous governments’ transfer, only a welfare improvement, and not its maximization, is 
hopefully the expected result). A Nash voluntary transfer takes place when the local government 
income reduction, which in turn implies a loss in terms of utility, is more than compensated by a 
utility gain originated by the overall public good provision. Individuals’ cross elasticities of 
marginal utility with respect to income and expenditure make it possible.
If we move to asymmetry of information, it follows that the central government is forced to 
pose very strict conditions in order to render the contract enforceable and get a social welfare 
improvement (still in a second best scenario). Both the receiver and the donor have to be submitted 
to audit and forced to show a well defined expenditure on both the private and the public good.
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14Appendix 1
Central Government maximization problem with full information
] , [ ] , [ ] , , [
j j i i j i y X U y X U y y X MaxW + =
t
subject to the following constraints:
j i x x X + = (associated lm: s )
- budget constraint
t J + = +
i i i i i R x E y ) , ( (associated lm: 
i l )
t J - = +
j j j j j R x E y ) , ( (associated lm: 
j l )
- non negativity constraints
0 , , , ³
j j i i y x y x
where i and j represents the regional type.
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i i i i i R x E y (a.7)
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15Appendix 2
From the first order conditions we derive the best reply function for the two type of jurisdictions. 
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the determinant of which is:
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Let’s first assume that a income variation in region i occurs.
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But using the following information: 














































E - > 1 . Which in turn implies that: 













Assuming now that only region j faces a income variation:
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Considering the utility variation for both regions when a money transfer from i to j occurs:
We assume that region i is characterized by higher cost (with respect to region j) in providing the 








x E E E E > > ; . When a transfer between the two regions occurs, it is 
tantamount to say that both regions face a income variation, equal in absolute value, but different in 
sign: dR=dRi =-dRj>0.
Let’s first assume a income variation in region i:
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. Thus a money transfer from i to j will cause a utility increase to the j 






















































A money transfer from i to j is suitable to produce a utility increase in j when the utility increase in 
the latter (region j) originated by the larger consumption of the private good y is greater than the 
































































- + - = 1 ,










we may conclude that a money transfer from i to j produces a utility increase for region i when:








































































































Central Government maximization problem with asymmetric information: focs
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j i l l (b.6)
0 ) , ( = - - + t J
i i i i i R x E y (b.7)
0 ) , ( = + - + t J
j j j j j R x E y (b.8)
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